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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the influence of land and property
privatization processes on urban development in Ho Chi Minh City
(HCMC), Vietnam. Many scholars have recognized that the
privatization policy regarding property and land use rights may
create a fragmentation of private land ownership, which
eventually can lead to what has been called the tragedy of the
anticommons. This paper observes how this phenomenon has also
threatened urban development in HCMC after the introduction of
the Doi Moi policy. Two case studies show two different types of
development processes in HCMC, namely a small self-
development project and a large-scale commercial project. Both
case studies reveal how (potential) tragedies of the anticommons
can be solved in different ways.
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The economic transition from a socialistic and centralized system to a more open market-
oriented system is still going on in Vietnam. The transition has also affected urban land
(re)development in Ho Chi Minh City – née Saigon (HCMC). As also happened in
many other countries experiencing this kind of transition, Vietnam – particularly
HCMC – has experienced changes from land and property privatization that reduce the
government’s overload responsibilities as well as risks in land developments and enable
it to benefit from capitalizing on land use rights by attaching more value to land
(Tsenkova, 2012). Before the transition, land in Vietnam was underutilized and not con-
sidered a resource with real value (Kim, 2009).
Although privatization can lead to a more economical use of natural resources (includ-
ing land) and is generally considered a desirable step in pushing the evolution of an area
along (De Soto, 2001; Loehr, 2012b; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2009), it can also bring forward
new issues related to land development processes. One such issue – that has also been
experienced by other transitional countries (Loehr, 2012a) – is the existence of ambiguous
and fragmented property rights over land or properties, which in the long run could
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eventually cause a counterproductive effect, namely the underuse of land resources. Heller
(1998) has referred to this issue as the tragedy of the anticommons, in which fragmented
ownership leads to diminishing prosperity. Anticommons property can be understood as
the mirror image of commons property and the related tragedy of the commons (Hardin,
1968) (see Section 2).
As later on argued by Heller (2013), the anticommons theory may seem well-
established, but it still requires more empirical studies and evidence. We explored two
case studies in HCMC that show two different types of private-led development processes:
a small-scale residential development project and a large-scale foreign investment project.
This paper aims to observe the impact of the privatization of land and property develop-
ment in HCMC on the occurrence of the anticommons phenomenon and the way private
investors respond. The results of this study may contribute both in offering empirical evi-
dence of the anticommons phenomenon and in providing a better understanding of the
consequences of changing land and property rights in transition economies, particularly
in HCMC. This research also aims to contribute to recent debates in Vietnam about
the involvement of the Central Government in real estate development (Ha, 2013).
The contents of this paper are structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the privatization of
property rights and land development in transitional economies. Section 3 discusses the
phenomenon of the tragedy of the anticommons in general. Section 4 provides a brief expla-
nation of land privatization in Vietnam and HCMC in particular. In Section 5 two case
studies from HCMC urban development processes are described, followed by a general dis-
cussion of the results in Section 6. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Privatization of property rights and land development in transitional
economies
A property right can be seen as the exclusive authority used to determine how a resource is
managed, whether a government, collective bodies, or individuals own that resource
(Aichian & Demsetz, 1973). In many countries that are in transition from a public-led
system to a more market-led system, the issue of individual property rights has become
a subject of debate. As argued by some scholars, the existence of individual property
rights plays an important role in decision-making to increase investments and the use
of a resource, which can explain the differences in economic behaviour and performance
between the public-led and market-led economic systems (see e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012; Libecap, 1986). Concerning urban land and property development, the significance
of a property rights regime securing individual property rights has received attention in
recent decades. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization and other governmental development organizations have adopted what is
called the capitalization by formalization agenda (Loehr, 2012a). This agenda is strongly
influenced – particularly in developing countries – by the work of De Soto (2001).
Various scholars have stated that secure individual property rights over land may affect
urban development in at least three different ways. First, it can enhance investment incen-
tives by limiting the risk of expropriation and by reducing the need to divert private
resources to protect property rights (Kapeliushnikov, Kuznetsov, Demina, & Kuznetsova,
2013). Second, well-defined property rights over land can facilitate the transfer of assets
and assists in the efficient allocation of land resources (Besley, 1995; Galiani &
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Schargrodsky, 2010). Third, formal rights over land can improve the ability of landowners
to use land as collateral, increasing landowner access to credit markets (De Soto, 2001).
In many transitional countries, the endorsement of individual property rights in land
privatization processes takes place as part of a broader land reform policy. The goal of
land privatization is mainly to improve livelihood opportunities and to enhance access
to land (May & Lahiff, 2007). However, two (related) problems may arise as a consequence
of this privatization process. First, not all transitional countries provide full ownership
rights to individuals or private entities in land, nor do they sufficiently add to the owner-
ship of rights the obligation to contribute to community costs (e.g. infrastructure). After
privatization processes are enacted, some restrictions for individuals to use the land may
remain, such as in China, Russia, Mongolia, Cambodia and Vietnam. The new property
rights regime may lead to the occurrence of ambiguous property rights (see e.g. Bagdai
& Tsolmon, 2009). Under ambiguous property rights, the owner’s control over his/her
resource is not guaranteed; that is, pre-agreed and binding rules regarding who will be
in control in various ex post contingencies are absent (Li, 1996). As shown by Bagdai,
van der Molen, and Tuladhar (2012) in the case of Russia, the restrictions for individuals
to use the land are aggravated by the lack of access to land information and inefficient land
administration systems. Li (1996) and Jieming (2002) have observed problems with
ambiguous property rights in China, while (Loehr, 2012a, 2012b) refers to the same
phenomenon in Cambodia. Li (1996) argues that ambiguous property rights lead to
high transaction costs and increased uncertainties in the market place. Interestingly,
however, Jieming (2002) and Li (1996) also show that despite the ambiguity of property
rights, the private sector – particularly in China – can still be successful. Apparently,
the ambiguous allocation of property rights over urban land has created opportunities
in the development process for various actors who have been able to capture resources
that have been left in the public domain. Loehr (2012b) points to a different issue: ‘in con-
trast to the viewpoint of the property rights theorists, private property in land may also
result in a decoupling of benefits and costs of land use’ (p. 776). The owners of ambiguous
property rights sometimes receive all the benefits from the ownership of these rights, but
do not contribute to public costs.
Secondly, privatization of property rights often contributes to the fragmentation of
these rights in existing urban areas, which may act as an institutional barrier to sustainable
transformation processes (Zhu, 2012). These two (related) problems, in fact, demonstrate
the possibility of the tragedy of the anticommons.
3. The tragedy of the commons and the anticommons
Before we discuss the tragedy of the anticommons, it is useful to explain its mirror image,
the tragedy of the commons, which has been more widely known and grounded in main-
stream scholarly debates. The term ‘the tragedy of the commons’ was introduced by
Hardin (1968) to explain the relations between human population growth, the use of
the Earth’s natural resources, and the state welfare system. The tragedy of the commons
is a situation in which resources are over-utilized by excessive usage of different agents
under open access of the resources to all potential users. Eventually, this overuse will
reduce the value of the resource to the users themselves (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000).
Hardin has referred to this as a tragedy because in this situation all individual users are
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expected to act for short-term individual benefits despite the long-term collective loss as a
result of the overuse.
The concept of the tragedy of the commons is helpful to explain why people overuse
shared resources (Barnett, 2010; Lin, 2012; Sturges, 2011). In 1998, Heller (1998) exam-
ined a mirror situation of the tragedy of the commons in which resources are underutilized
rather than over-utilized, which he called the Tragedy of the Anticommons. Heller (1998)
defines the tragedy of the anticommons as follows:
In an anticommons (p. 624) multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude
others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are
too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse – a
tragedy of the anticommons.
The problem of anticommons is mainly caused by the inefficient division of property
among multiple individuals (Heller, 1998). The perceived transaction and strategic cost
of consolidating the property among those individuals is greater than the increased
values that are expected from the reunification of those properties. Heller developed his
theory after observing the situation in Moscow in the 1990s, where he noted that many
storefronts were empty while the street kiosks in front were full of goods. The tragedy
of the anticommons can also be observed in the case of fragmented land ownership in
a particular urban area, especially when each landowner would prevent others from devel-
oping the land resource. This situation will eventually create a hold out or stalled-develop-
ment problem. According to Heller (1998), this is a type of coordination breakdown in
which a single resource has various rights holders, and no one has sufficient privilege of
use. The anticommons tragedy would therefore emerge when initial endowments are
created as disaggregated rights rather than as combined bundles of rights over scarce
resources. This problem can appear whenever governments create new property rights.
Heller (1998) also argued that although the initial endowment of property rights was
clearly defined, the tragedy of the anticommons might remain, especially when there
are ambiguous property rights in which the government is still a right-holder along
with the rights that are given to private individuals.
Eminent domain is often used as a way to solve the problems of the tragedy of the antic-
ommons on land and property markets (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000; Loehr, 2011, 2012b;
Sim, Lum, & Malone-Lee, 2002; Zhu, 2012). Heller (1998) specifically called for an inter-
vention of the central government in such cases, for instance by abolishing the rights that
were previously granted, eliminating lower levels of government or by expropriating the
existing rights. In Vietnam, and particularly in HCMC, problems of the anticommons
have also occurred. Though we have no exact data that show how often these problems
occur, the substantial amount of stalled developments can be used to indicate that it is
a serious issue in HCMC’s land and property development. In 2014, the HCMC Depart-
ment of Construction listed around 536 housing and commercial development projects
that were stalled, covering a total area of over 5397 ha of land. As explained by the
HCMC Department of Construction, the delays in these projects, on the one hand,
seem to be caused mainly by lack of public funding and planning procedures, and on
the other hand problems with clearing the land due to fragmented property rights that
can be related to the tragedy of the anticommons. The present study will demonstrate
through two different case studies how tragedy of the anticommons-like problems have
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SCIENCES 75
occurred in the land and property market in HCMC and how the related stakeholders
have dealt with these problems. However, before we explore these two case studies, we
will first pay attention to the privatization processes, with respect to land and property
in Vietnam, that have occurred since the introduction of the Doi Moi policy.
4. Land and property privatization in Vietnam
In 1986, the Vietnamese central government started economic reform by introducing the
Doi Moi policy. It marked the beginning of Vietnam’s economic transition from a social-
ist-centralistic system to a more market-oriented one. The change also affected land and
property in Vietnam with the introduction of a new land law in 1988 that permitted the
grant of land use rights to organizational and individual land-users while still affirming
that only the state – in the name of all citizens – is the sole administrator of the land.
However, it was not until 1993 that the land market in Vietnam began to change when
another new land law was introduced that gave wider land use rights to private parties.
The individual rights included the right to transfer, exchange, lease, inherit and mortgage
property. Soon after the introduction of this 1993 land law, many new commercial as well
as residential developments (also redevelopments) emerged. Individuals in Vietnam were
now able to secure long-term land use rights that were almost similar to full ownership
(Tuyen, 2010).
After several revisions and further changes in land laws, the latest update of the Viet-
namese Land Law took place in 2013. This 2013 Land Law contains some improvements
with respect to land transactions and land prices. It regulates the procedures for both the
state and private sector to take decisions on land acquisitions and upgrades the rights of
foreign investors.1 Currently 100% of foreign-owned investment is possible in Vietnam,
although joint ventures between foreign and local companies are still very common.
For foreign companies, cooperation with Vietnamese companies (which can be both
state-owned or fully private) usually makes land acquisition and procedures easier
(Thao, 2013).
Another important regulation related to property was introduced in 1994 in Vietnam.
It was Decree 61/1994/NĐ-CP, which proclaimed that the municipality wanted to sell all
state-owned houses to their existing tenants. Under this regulation, large numbers of old
houses were transferred to the current users at a subsidized price. It was much lower than
the market price to reward them for their engagement in the war. Most of the buyers were
war veterans and government officers. Particularly in HCMC, up to 2013, the city auth-
ority had sold around 97,000 houses under this regulation, but it still aims to sell
another 13,000 houses. In 2013, this regulation was replaced by Decree 34/2013/NĐ-
CP, which stated that the new price would be closer to market prices, and a user could
buy two or three state houses instead of only one.
5. The tragedy of the anticommons in land and property development:
two case studies from HCMC
In general, land development in HCMC can be categorized into two different types: small,
individual projects by the owner-user, and large-scale projects by real estate developers. The
amount of each type of development can be derived from the number of construction
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permits that were issued by the HCMCDepartment of Planning and Architecture (Table 1).
According to the Vice-Director of the Department, most of the capital for the high-rises or
large residential projects comes from foreign funds, either direct or indirectly.
In this section, two case studies in District 1, HCMC (Figure 1) will be presented: one
case for each type of development mentioned above. The basic profiles of these two case
studies are shown in Table 2.
This study is based on both primary and secondary data. The primary data were col-
lected from on-site observations and interviews with principal informants during field
research conducted for a period of six months from 2011 to 2012. There were 17 inter-
views with 6 real estate experts (developers, academics and researchers); 9 government
officers at the HCMC Department of Planning and Architecture, Department of Invest-
ment, Institute for Development Studies and Real Estate Association; as well as two indi-
vidual homeowners who were involved in the cases. The secondary data were gathered
from the HCMC Department of Architecture and Planning as well as documents and
Figure 1. Location of the two case studies in District 1, HCMC, Vietnam.
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paperwork related to the projects owned by the interviewees in the case studies. The offi-
cers and homeowners provided inside stories about the projects. This paper uses the
primary and secondary data to form independent opinions about the cases, which do
not necessarily represent the opinions of the interviewees.
5.1. Case study 1: 240 Le Thanh Ton street building
The first case study concerns a redevelopment project in a small residential apartment
block located at 240 Le Thanh Ton St., District 1, downtown HCMC and close to the his-
toric Ben Thanh Market (Figure 2). The apartment block was first built in the 1940s as a
two-storey residential building. During the VietnamWar (1954–1975), an Indian national
owned the property and let the building to a Chinese family. The tenant, in turn, sublet
part of the building to a hairdresser shop. After HCMC – which was still called Saigon
at that time – became part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 30 April 1975, the
Indian owner went to his homeland and relinquished his ownership of the property.
Along with that, the Chinese tenant and the owner of the hairdresser shop also left the

















permit Total floor area
2001 231 703,671.00 9452 1,719,227.00 9683 2,422,898.00
2002 224 627,394.94 10,855 1,753,843.71 11,079 2,381,238.65
2003 192 1,076,513.90 14,993 2,542,409.00 15,185 3,618,922.90
2004 328 1,242,768.62 21,213 3,690,521.00 21,541 4,933,289.62
2005 431 1,912,577.09 21,848 4,035,160.20 22,279 5,947,737.29
2006 297 894,151.16 24,074 4,675,377.74 24,371 5,569,528.90
2007 214 1,045,285.30 27,947 5,566,271.26 28,161 6,611,556.56
2008 149 734,507.25 25,434 5,176,900.00 25,583 5,911,407.25
2009 164 517,037.52 31,044 5,470,000.00 31,208 5,987,037.52
2010 286 1,660,735.07 46,408 8,444,872.65 46,694 10,105,607.72
2011 228 1,504,872.44 41,472 5,571,627.56 41,700 7,076,500.00
2012 219 1,165,796.57 29,249 3,834,103.43 29,468 4,999,900.00
2013 156 1,414,847.52 34,740 5,245,153.18 34,896 6,660,000.70
2014 205 2,781,074.56 54,200 13,656,529.17 54,405 16,437,603.73
2001–
2014
3324 17,281,232.94 392,929 71,381,995.90 396,253 88,663,228.84
Note: The Department of Construction only controls large-scale projects (public, private project); the district level manages
individual/household construction (small level).
Table 2. Profiles of two projects.
Name of project 240 Le Thanh Ton Kumho Asiana Plaza
Former owner State State+private
New owner 1 Household family Korean company
Area 100 m2 2000 m2
Capital investment (USD) 0.5 million (1999) 150 million (2010)
Type of building
Old House House, state office
New Commercial Commercial
Duration of development 1997–2000 (3 years) 1995–2009 (9 years)
Investment form Private Joint venture
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country because of the difficult political and economic situation at that time. Conse-
quently, the building was vacant and unoccupied until it was taken over by the State on
22 September 1975 as part of a national programme to nationalize empty houses in the
city after the war from 1955 to 1975 between the USA and Vietnam. Later on, those
empty houses were handed over to the city government. On 19 September 1978, the
city government officially issued a certificate for the building at 240 Le Thanh Ton
St. to be used by the HCMC University of Architecture for its employees. According to
this decision, the Housing Management Company of HCMC had the rights to make a
rental contract and collect rent from the users of the building. The property changed
hands and was redeveloped for commercial use (Figure 3).
On 5 October 1978, the HCMC University of Architecture made a decision to allocate
the house to two of its lecturers and their families: one professor (user 1) and his family
occupied the ground floor, and the other (user 2) occupied the first and second floor. Each
household paid 11.2 VND monthly (out of an average salary of 80 VND/month in the
1970–1980s) for rent.
With the state as the sole owner of the land and the building, maintenance and
upgrades of the building also depended on the State. For almost 20 years, the State did
not make any significant maintenance or renovations to the building. As a result, the
quality of the building had deteriorated, as did most of the other state house rentals in
the city.
Figure 2. Location of the first case study. Source: Ho Chi Minh City Department of Planning and Archi-
tecture (2002).
Figure 3. History of the development of the 240 Le Thanh Ton Building.
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After the introduction of Decree 61/1994/NĐ-CP about the selling of state houses, user
1 intended to buy the building to upgrade it. User 2, however, was not interested in doing
this. In 1997, user 1 made an informal agreement with user 2 that if the municipality trans-
ferred the ownership of the building to both of them, user 2 would agree to sell his own-
ership rights to user 1. With that agreement in place, both users submitted an application
later that year to purchase the building. The HCMC Municipality, through the Housing
Business Company of District 1, agreed to sell the right to use the building based on a
long-term ‘eternal’ lease to each of the two existing tenants. According to the contracts
of the sale (7*9/97/HD-MBNO-1 and 2*0/97/HD-MBNO) dated 30 December 1997,
each buyer was required to pay US$40,000, which, according to user 1 in an interview,
was around 50% lower than the market price at that time for the following items:
. The house (2 stories and very low quality construction).
. The land use rights.
This transaction, however, did not include ownership of the land, which still belonged
to the State.
Since only user 1 was interested in buying the building, user 1 paid US$80,000 to the
State both for his and user 2’s land use rights and housing ownership. On 1 April 1998,
the HCMC municipality decided to issue two land use rights and housing ownership cer-
tificates for the building: one to user 1 and one to user 2. With this decision, user 2
obtained the rights without paying, and he retained legal ownership of the first and
second floor, including the rights to build on top of it (air rights). As previously agreed,
user 1 had to buy user 2’s rights to obtain full ownership of the property. User 1 then
paid user 2 another US$40,000 and completed the old contract in January 1998, which
was before the contract with the HCMC municipality was made. This process meant
that the property was transferred from State ownership into a single private ownership
via a multi-private ownership, with a US$120,000 investment by user 1 (around |US
$1500/m2). By doing this, user 1 obtained the rights to redevelop the whole building
and the rights that enabled him to make profit from it.
After user 2 left the house, user 1 – as the sole holder of the use rights of the building –
asked the municipality for permission to change the function of the property from residen-
tial to commercial. It is a compulsory process to enable the building to be rented by
foreigners.2 On 13 July 1998, the owner was granted permission to let the house to
foreigners (Certificate #2*1/GPCT.DB). Also in the same year, user 1 applied for
another permission to demolish the old two-storey building and to build a new five-
story building. Permission was granted (Certificate # 21*/GPXD) soon afterwards, and
the new building was completed one year later (Figure 4).
The first lease went to a Taiwanese merchant, who rented the building for the price of |
US$1200/month. A few years later, both the value of the new commercial building and its
rent had tripled. In 1997, before the purchase from the state, the building was valued
approximately at US$150,000; this increased to US$1 million in 2003 and US$2.5
million in 2013. Within two years after the completion of the project (2000), the invest-
ment costs were recovered, and it started to make a profit. The rental price has continued
to increase since 2000 (Figure 5). From 2009 up until now, the whole building has been let
to a Japanese Restaurant (Figure 6) for a rent of US$5500/month (2015). The owner pays a
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city income tax of 18% from the monthly rental income. Compared with the earnings
gained during the pre-privatization period, both the developer and the government
have thus seen their income from the building increase substantially.
5.2. Case study 2: Kumho Plaza, 39 Le Duan Boulevard
The second case study is the development of a large-scale foreign investment project at 39
Le Duan Boulevard, also known as Kumho Asiana Plaza. The total project covered an area
of 13,632 m2, and the location is surrounded by four streets: Le Duan Boulevard, Hai Ba
Trung Street, Nguyen Du Street and Le Van Huu Street (Figure 7). The whole block was in
use by several buildings for different activities, including: residential use for mostly
Figure 4. Transformation of house 240 Le Thanh Ton St., HCMC. Source: The owner of building (2010).
Figure 5. Trends of Rent prices for the 240 Le Thanh Ton St. building from 1999 to 2012.
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government officers, some office buildings in use by both government and non-govern-
ment organizations, as well as some small commercial activities (Figure 7).
After the introduction of the 1993 Land Law, many private real estate developers – both
domestic and foreign – took the chance to invest in the Vietnamese land development,
particularly in HCMC.3 Some foreign investors expressed their interest to develop the
whole block at 39 Le Duan Boulevard because of its strategic location in the heart of
the city centre. It took 14 years for Kumho E&C to develop the project (Figure 8).
In June 1996, the joint venture company Kumho-Saigon gained approval from theMin-
istry of Planning and Investment (MPI) to operate the development of the block with an
Figure 6. Tokyo Deli Restaurant at 240 Le Thanh Ton St. since 2009. Source: Field Survey (2015).
Figure 7. The previous land use structure of case study 2. Source: Ho Chi Minh City Department of
Planning and Architecture (1988).
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investment up to US$225 million. The joint venture consisted of three companies: Saigon
Tourist (SGT), Housing Development & Service of District 1 (SHD.D1) – the two of them
were the original owners of the property – and the Kumho Construction & Engineering
Inc. Kumho C&E is a Korean construction and real estate company and member of a
large, internationally well-known conglomerate, the Kumho Asiana Group. Kumho con-
tributed 65% of the capital, while the remaining 35% came from the Vietnamese parties,
SGT and SHD.D1. The investment share of the two Vietnamese companies was equal to
the value of the land they already owned on the block. The operation period of the land
lease was 45 years from the date issued on the license, with a land rent paid of US$13.6/m2
per year. After 45 years, the local authority would give the existing users priority to apply
for an extension of the land use rights.
The planned development included a luxury hotel, a conference centre, offices, high-
class apartments, a restaurant, and entertainment with a total investment of US$150
million. In 1996, Kumho contributed US$15.2 million to the joint venture company for
the first stage of the project to be used for land acquisition (compensation paid to families
living at that location) and site clearance. Kumho also promised the HCMC authorities to
donate US$1 million to the public infrastructure investment fund of the city.
The Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997, and many big companies were heavily
affected, including Kumho. On 18 June 1997, the joint venture company, Kumho-
Saigon officially requested postponement of the deployment of the project. In response,
the Ministry of Planning & Investment and other state agencies approved the request to
restart the project by the year 2000 at the latest. However, Kumho still had financial pro-
blems in 2000 and asked to postpone the project again. The request was again approved by
the State. A new deadline for Kumho-Saigon to start the project was set for September
Figure 8. Timeline of the Kumho project development.
Figure 9. The Saigon square and M & TOI music café. Source: Đu ̛c (2005).
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2002. In order to minimize the inefficient use of the cleared site of the block in the interim
period, the Vietnamese partners leased the land to Phan Thanh LTD. Co. to develop a
temporary shopping centre from simple construction that was called the Saigon Square
in 2000. Later, in 2002, the M & Toi music café also rented a part of the area (Figure 9).
In mid-2002, SGT – one of the two local partners in the joint venture – put forward
a proposal to purchase Kumho’s share in the joint venture with support from the
HCMC municipality. The main reason for this proposal was that both the domestic
partners and the city were worried about Kumho’s capability to invest. The munici-
pality had become impatient with the delays of the project and wanted to put the
land into operation as quickly as possible. The municipality therefore supported the
idea to replace Kumho as the foreign partner in the project, but promised Kumho
that the municipality would secure Kumho’s involvement in another development
projects in the future if Kumho would agree to the proposal. Moreover, as confirmed
by an officer from the HCMC Department of Investment during an interview,
Shangri-La Asia, a well-known Hong Kong-based hotel chain company, knew about
the financial issues that Kumho faced and asked the domestic partners to be substi-
tuted for Kumho.
Kumho decided to offer its share to SGT for a price of US$13.6 million, but SGT agreed
to pay only US$10.3 million, which was equal to the actual costs for the land acquisition
that had been spent earlier. At that time, Kumho was in a weak position because according
to the agreement between Kumho and the MPI, property rights over the land would be
revoked if the development did not start by the given deadline. Kumho then responded
to SGT’s proposal by stating that it would agree to the price, but under two conditions.
First, the Vietnamese partners would not transfer the project to any other investor.
Second, the Vietnamese partners would have to continue with the project by themselves
under the name and the design of the original Kumho Project.
On 12 December 2003, the HCMC municipality received an official dispatch (Number
63*/CV-TCT) from the Vietnamese partners stating that Kumho agreed to transfer its
share for a price of US$10.3 million. However, this was objected by Kumho. They
claimed that the decision had to be made by the Prime Minister of Vietnam, together
with the MPI, and not by the HCMC municipality, because it was the Prime Minister,
through the MPI, who had approved the investment license.4 The project was not defini-
tively terminated although the deadline to deploy the project had been passed for quite
some time. As a result, the land was not optimally used during that time.
In 2005, the dispute was finally resolved. The Prime Minister of Vietnam issued a final
decision to overrule the inclination of the Vietnamese partners in the Kumho-Saigon joint
venture company and the HCMC municipality to replace Kumho by another foreign
investor in the joint venture. The Prime Minister decided that Kumho Construction &
Engineering Inc. was allowed to continue to participate in the joint venture and to
carry out the development project. The local partners sold their share of the joint
project. Kumho paid US$38,852,800 to obtain ownership of the whole project (creating
100% of the ownership by a foreign company). This step enabled Kumho to capture
most of the positive value created by the investment project, though Kumho lost 10
years of its long-lease contract (Figure 10). Construction started a year later and was com-
pleted in 2010. Since it first opened in 2010, the market in HCMC has been continuously
splendid for business, including for the Kumho Asiana Plaza. In 2013 it had an occupancy
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rate of 98% (Colliers-International, 2013). Despite all its difficulties, in the end, the devel-
opment of the Kumho Asiana Plaza has become a successful project (Figure 10).
6. Discussion
The dynamic of the private sector has created spontaneous development throughout the
history of HCMC (Huynh & Peiser, 2015). Private developers were able – in different ways
– to capture part of the rising real estate values during the transition period. The case
studies above provide an inside story of how the stakeholders have been able to overcome
a potential tragedy of the anticommons. In this section, the lesson learnt based on both
case studies will be discussed, together with some suggestions for policy implications
about possible tragedies of the anticommons in Vietnam.
6.1. Lesson learnt
Both case studies display examples of a (potential) tragedy of anticommons in HCMC,
Vietnam, and the way the owners were able to actually prevent such tragedies. In the
first case study, in the beginning the anticommons problem occurred because of the exist-
ence of ambiguous property rights. Before the 1993 Land Law and the announcement of
Decree 61/1994/NĐ-CP, most households, especially those who lived in a state-owned
house, did not have full control over their property. This was also the case for the occu-
pants at 240 Le Thanh Ton Street after the Vietnam War. The situation prevented the
Figure 10. The Kumho Asiana Plaza: offices, apartments, the InterContinental Asiana Saigon hotel and
residences. Source: https://c1.staticflickr.com/5/4056/4652668334_1ba967fea5.jpg.
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users from upgrading the building and created inefficient use of the building, that is, a
tragedy of the anticommons. The problem was solved when the rights over the building
were more clearly defined with the introduction of the 1993 Land Law, and later on
Decree 61/1994/NĐ-CP. However, if user 2 in case study 1 would have declined to sell
his rights over the building to user 1, the intentions of user 1 to upgrade the building
could still have been frustrating.
In the second case study, ambiguous property rights also created a tragedy of the antic-
ommons over a period of 10 years. The disagreements between the foreign and domestic
partners over the transfer of rights, as well as the unclear rights arrangement among firms,
the municipality and the national government, further delayed the project and led to a
situation in which the land was sub-optimally utilized. The Vietnamese central govern-
ment in the current transition era still does not endow any individual or local authority
with a bundle of rights that represents full control of land. This situation was used by
Kumho to keep the land and stay in business by involving the national government in
the dispute with its local partners in the joint venture and the HCMC municipality.
According to Heller (1998), a tragedy of anticommons can be resolved through inter-
vention by a central government: for instance, by abolishing the rights that were previously
granted, eliminating lower levels of government, or expropriating the existing rights.
Unlike Heller’s approach, Li (1996) argued that a partnership with the authority in a devel-
opment project could resolve a tragedy of the anticommons, although this will increase the
ambiguity of property rights.
In case study 1, neither of those solutions was used to solve the problem. User 1 stra-
tegically used an informal negotiation with user 2 to purchase the contiguous and yet frag-
mented rights over the building before attempting to obtain the necessary approvals from
the authority to buy the rights. The advantage of this strategy is that the informal agree-
ment with user 2 minimized the chance of a hold out. Surely, there was the risk of having
to buy out user 2’s rights twice. Nevertheless, user 1′s expectation of the future property
market eventually paid off. From this case study, we can draw a lesson that even if an
ambiguity of property rights still exists, the possibility to transfer property rights
between public and private parties, as well as between private parties, can enable the
parties to overcome a tragedy of the anticommons. Another important lesson is that stra-
tegic speculation over the expected value resulting from the investment can be considered
the core of the successful transfer of property rights.
Case study 2 reveals how the Chinese example of using the positive effect of ambiguous
property rights (as explained by Li (1996)) also appeared in Vietnam. Unlike Li’s example,
however, the government did not seek to be involved as partner or co-owner in the project.
Both the domestic and foreign partners in the Kumho-Saigon joint venture tried to link
authority only as far as to support their claims over the land. While the local partners
found their support from the municipality, Kumho strategically attempted to get
support from the national government by involving the Prime Minister and the MPI to
solve the dispute. This eventually enabled Kumho to continue with the development.
6.2. Policy implications
To implement successful policies to avoid potential anticommons problems, it is impor-
tant to understand the nature of anticommons in a particular context. Based on the
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context of the two case studies in this research, both ambiguous property rights (where
there are various rights over land resources with uncertainty to control the resource)
and the high cost of consolidating the exclusionary rights are the main cause of the
tragedy of the anticommons. Inefficiency persists in the tragedy of the anticommons
because the cost of strengthening the full rights of each owner of a parcel of land is
greater than the increased rents the unification of the parcels is expected to generate
(Buchanan & Yoon, 2000). In order to overcome this problem, involved parties may
consider taking the risk to cover the cost of consolidating the exclusionary rights. In
case study 1, it was user 1 who took the risk to cover the cost by buying the rights.
In case study 2, Kumho took the risk to stay in business and faced with high transaction
costs due to the length of the negotiation process, which made it lost 10 years of its
long-lease contract.
Another important element is the fact that exclusionary rights can only be consolidated
when the rights are fully transferable. From case study 1, it was apparent that transferable
development rights were part of the solution for the tragedy of the anticommons. Due to
the introduction of the 1993 Land Law and Decree 61/1994/NĐ-CP, the right to use and
develop the building was transferred from the state to a private entity, and also from one
private entity to another. By paying user 2 extra money, with an expectation of high rent
values after the redevelopment of the property, user 1 was able not only to transfer the
rights from the municipality to the tenants, but also from user 2 to user 1. In case
study 2, however, the municipality and the two domestic partners in the joint venture
company could not force Kumho to transfer its rights. The price Kumho asked for its
rights was considered too high by the municipality and the domestic partners. This fact
further delayed the development and intensified the tragedy of the anticommons, while
Kumho adequately captured the development values (despite some losses because of the
delay of the development).
In the context of land and property development in HCMC, several policy implications
can be considered to overcome the potential tragedy of the anticommons. First, regulatory
reform can simplify and also handle the enforcement of land use regulations. At the very
least, the discretion that regulatory agencies have in enforcing land use regulations should
be minimized. As in many countries with transitional economies, coordination and auth-
ority between state and local governments to enforce land use regulations is still unclear in
Vietnam. To completely replace the current system of land use regulation might not be a
plausible short-term solution. However, clarity to enforce a rule that has been made is
obviously something that can be done before long to reform the system. Another policy
implication that can be considered to mitigate the tragedy of the anticommons, particu-
larly in the case of HCMC, is to engage further in the use of transferable development
rights. The successful transfer of development rights might be related to the expected
values of the development in an open market. Transparency in land and property
values is crucial for the creation of such a market. Public authorities should promote
and support this transparency.
7. Conclusions
This article has discussed the privatization of property rights in land and property markets
in Vietnam. Privatization has unlocked property values and created new opportunities for
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land and property development, which has attracted both domestic and foreign invest-
ments (Yip & Tran, 2015). However, the reforms have created problems as well. One of
them is the tragedy of the anticommons. Some have warned against the approach of for-
malization and capitalization – because of the tragedy of the anticommons phenomenon –
and have suggested a reframing of development policy (Loehr, 2012a). The present study
argues neither in favour nor against the formalization and capitalization processes, but
rather provides some evidence of how property owners in situations of ambiguous prop-
erty rights have been able to avoid anticommons tragedies by way of informal negotiations
with other owners.
The results of the present study contribute empirical evidence of the tragedy of the
anticommons in Vietnam to existing anticommons literature and provide a better under-
standing of the consequences of changing land and property rights in Vietnam, particu-
larly in HCMC. Nonetheless, this investigation also contains limitations. First of all, it
only shows two cases while there are some evidence indicating that many more of these
cases can be found in HCMC (which was also mentioned in this study). Although
those two cases somehow represent typical examples of land and property development
in HCMC, every single case is unique and one cannot just generalize the results of this
study. Nevertheless, the lessons learnt and suggested policy implications from the case
studies can probably be extended to land and property development not only in
HCMC, but also through greater Vietnam.
Notes
1. See Nguyen, van der Krabben, and Samsura (2014) for more information about institutional
change related to land and property development in Vietnam.
2. Before 2000, the owner of a property still needed a license to let the building to a foreign user.
This regulation has been cancelled.
3. According to the law at that time, a foreign company had to establish a joint venture with a
domestic company in order to make an investment in Vietnam.
4. According to Vietnamese Law, all projects with a capital investment of US$75 million or
more must be approved by the Prime Minister.
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